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“AT HOME” IN GEORGIA:                                      
THE HIDDEN DANGER OF REGISTERING TO DO 
BUSINESS IN GEORGIA 
Brian P. Watt, Esq.* & W. Alex Smith, Esq.** 
INTRODUCTION 
Georgia law prohibits any foreign corporation—a corporation with 
an originating registration initiated in a state other than Georgia—
from transacting business in the state until it obtains a certificate of 
authority from the Georgia Secretary of State.1 Attorneys advise 
foreign corporations to register to transact business in Georgia as a 
matter of course, and business owners readily comply. On the 
surface, registration appears innocuous—submit paperwork and pay a 
fee to the state. In return, the corporation reaps the benefits of 
transacting business throughout Georgia. 
But what often evades business owners—and some practitioners—
is that registering to do business in Georgia operates as a veiled 
forfeiture of a fundamental right—the corporation’s right to due 
process, which imposes a limit on the state’s exercise of jurisdiction 
over the corporation.2 By virtue of its registration, a foreign 
corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Georgia.3 
That means it must respond to any lawsuit filed against it in a 
Georgia court.4 The foreign corporation must do so no matter how 
remote the lawsuit’s connection is to Georgia.5 
 
     * Partner, Troutman Sanders. J.D., University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., University of 
Georgia. 
     ** Associate, Troutman Sanders. J.D., University of Georgia School of Law; B.A., University of 
Georgia. 
 1. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) (2017). 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
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Georgia is not unique in its registration requirement. Every state in 
the Union has a similar statute.6 But very few states require a foreign 
corporation to forfeit the guarantees of due process as a condition for 
transacting business in the state. Georgia is one of them. 
The current state of Georgia law is bad practice. It encourages 
forum shopping, and it cools interstate commerce by potentially 
deterring foreign corporations from registering to do business in 
Georgia. Usually, a Georgia resident would rather file a lawsuit 
against a foreign corporation in Georgia to avail himself of an 
ostensibly friendly forum. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
recognized, “[N]o doctorate in astrophysics is required to deduce that 
trying a case where one lives is almost always a plaintiff’s 
preference.”7 More significantly, however, a plaintiff can avail 
himself of favorable Georgia procedural law—including, critically, 
Georgia’s statutes of limitations8—simply by filing his lawsuit in 
Georgia rather than in another forum. A recent case decided by the 
Georgia Court of Appeals exemplifies the forum shopping that 
Georgia law currently allows: a Georgia resident filed suit against a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in 
Maryland based on alleged tortious conduct that occurred in Texas.9 
The court held that the corporation is subject to jurisdiction in 
Georgia based solely on its registration to do business in the state.10 
The potential for exploitation aside, Georgia law likely violates 
federal law. Recently, the United States Supreme Court transformed 
the landscape for the exercise of general jurisdiction, greatly limiting 
the fora in which a foreign corporation can be subject to general 
 
 6. Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1363–64 n.109, 1364–65 nn.111–12 (2015). 
 7. Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 8. See Gray v. Armstrong, 474 S.E.2d 280, 281 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (noting statutes of limitations 
are procedural and thus the law of the forum applies notwithstanding where the tort was committed). 
 9. Ward v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. A19A0826, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 592, at *1 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 
24, 2019). 
 10. Id. at *6–10. 
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jurisdiction.11 Georgia law must be reformed in light of modern-day 
strictures of federal due process. 
I. A Brief Overview of Personal Jurisdiction 
A state’s courts can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant only if 
that power satisfies two prerequisites: (1) state law—typically the 
state’s long-arm statute; and (2) the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.12 As 
discussed below, the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the 
exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation registered 
to do business in Georgia is authorized by state law.13 We do not 
question the court’s interpretation of Georgia law for the purposes of 
this article. Rather, our focus is whether the court’s holding comports 
with the second step: the protections of due process. 
“The Due Process Clause protects an individual’s liberty interest in 
not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he 
has established no meaningful ‘contacts, ties, or relations.’”14 Unless 
the defendant has sufficient “minimum contacts,” due process 
prevents a state from exercising jurisdiction over the rights or 
interests of a nonresident defendant.15 Due process can be satisfied 
under either one of two categories of jurisdiction: specific or 
general.16 
The exercise of specific jurisdiction requires that the litigation 
arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum 
state.17 Typically, that means the conduct underlying the claims of 
the lawsuit takes place in the forum state. It is the controversy itself 
that establishes jurisdiction. If the lawsuit is not sufficiently 
 
 11. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 12. Diamond Crystal Brands, Inc. v. Food Movers Int’l, 593 F.3d 1249, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 13. See infra Part II. 
 14. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)). 
 15. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
 16. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472–73 n.15. 
 17. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 283–84 (2014). 
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connected to the defendant’s contacts with the state, specific 
jurisdiction is not satisfied, and the court cannot preside over the 
lawsuit. 
General jurisdiction, by contrast, focuses solely on the sufficiency 
of the defendant’s contacts with the state. A state that exercises 
general jurisdiction can “hear any and all claims” against the 
defendant.18 As the United States Supreme Court recognized, “Even 
when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign 
corporation’s activities in the forum State, due process is not 
offended by a State’s subjecting the corporation to its in personam 
jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the State and 
the foreign corporation.”19 
After the Supreme Court issued its watershed opinion in 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington in 1945,20 the exercise of 
specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporation was subject to a 
relatively defined analysis. A court examined whether there existed 
“an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy, 
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the 
forum State.’ When no such connection exists, specific jurisdiction is 
lacking regardless of the extent of a defendant’s unconnected 
activities in the State.”21 
The exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, 
however, remained unresolved. Most courts relied upon the nebulous 
standard espoused in International Shoe, which posited that there 
may exist “instances in which the continuous corporate operations 
within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature” as to 
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction.22 Yet over the next sixty-
five years, the Court issued only two opinions discussing general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.23 Courts were left without 
 
 18. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
 19. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984). 
 20. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310. 
 21. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1776 (2017) (quoting Goodyear, 
564 U.S. at 919) (citation omitted). 
 22. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
 23. See generally Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
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much guidance to define the contacts necessary to subject a 
corporation to general jurisdiction. 
It was in this context that the Supreme Court of Georgia concluded 
that a foreign corporation’s registration to do business rendered it 
subject to general jurisdiction in Georgia. 
II. The Supreme Court of Georgia Holds that All Foreign 
Corporations Registered to Do Business in Georgia Are Subject to 
General Jurisdiction in the State 
In 1992, the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Klein24 analyzed whether Georgia could exercise 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation registered to do business in the 
state. The plaintiff was a passenger involved in a car wreck in 
Georgia.25 Allstate insured the car under a New Jersey policy.26 The 
plaintiff sued Allstate in Georgia for injuries sustained in the 
collision.27 Allstate moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal 
jurisdiction, arguing that any nexus between the claims and Allstate’s 
activities in Georgia was too tenuous to satisfy the first step of the 
jurisdictional analysis—the Georgia Long-Arm Statute.28 
The trial court granted the motion, but the court of appeals 
reversed, holding that the court could exercise specific jurisdiction 
because the suit was sufficiently connected to Allstate’s contacts with 
Georgia.29 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the exercise of 
jurisdiction over Allstate, but for a different reason.30 The court 
focused on the language of the Georgia Long-Arm Statute, which 
applies exclusively to jurisdiction over Georgia nonresidents.31 The 
court reasoned that because the statute defines nonresident as 
 
(1952). 
 24. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992). 
 25. Id. at 864. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Klein, 422 S.E.2d at 864–65. 
 31. Id. at 865. 
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including only foreign corporations not authorized to transact 
business in the state, a foreign corporation registered to do business 
in Georgia must be considered a resident for the purposes of 
jurisdiction.32 The court concluded: 
As a resident, such a foreign corporation may sue or be sued to 
the same extent as a domestic corporation. Therefore, a plaintiff 
wishing to sue in Georgia a corporation authorized to do 
business in Georgia is not restricted by the personal jurisdiction 
parameters of [the Long-Arm Statute], including the requirement 
that a cause of action arise out of a defendant’s activities within 
the state.33 
In other words, a foreign corporation registered to do business is 
subject to general jurisdiction. 
The court, however, made short shrift of the second step of the 
jurisdictional analysis—the due process inquiry. In a footnote, the 
court noted that whether the exercise of general jurisdiction over a 
registered foreign corporation comported with due process had “not 
been challenged in this case.”34 The court surmised simply that “it 
appears” that such jurisdiction “does not run afoul of the ‘minimum 
contacts’ requirement of procedural due process.”35 
III. United States Supreme Court’s Recent General Jurisdiction 
Jurisprudence 
In 2011, the United States Supreme Court finally revisited the 
exercise of general jurisdiction. The Court’s decision in Goodyear 
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown36 restricted the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation tremendously. 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 865 n.3. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See generally Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
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A. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown 
In Goodyear, plaintiffs filed suit in North Carolina against foreign 
corporations, alleging that a tire produced by the companies caused 
the death of two children in France.37 The foreign corporations 
manufactured tires primarily for sale in foreign markets.38 A small 
number of their tires, however, were distributed in North Carolina by 
affiliates, although the type of tire involved in the accident was never 
distributed in the state.39 
The corporations moved to dismiss the suit for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.40 The trial court denied the motion, and the North 
Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.41 The court held that the 
corporations were subject to general jurisdiction, stating that the 
defendants had “continuous and systematic contacts” with the state 
because they placed their tires in the stream of commerce without 
any limitation on the extent to which those tires could be sold in 
North Carolina.42 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.43 
The Court reasoned that the manufacturers’ contacts with the forum 
were too attenuated to empower North Carolina to adjudicate claims 
unrelated to those contacts.44 The Court established the proper 
standard for analyzing whether a state’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation comports with due process: 
the corporation’s affiliations with the state must be “so ‘continuous 
and systematic’ as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum 
State.”45 The Court identified a corporation’s place of incorporation 
and principal place of business as the “paradigm” forum(s) in which 
 
 37. Id. at 920–21. 
 38. Id. at 921. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 921–22. 
 41. Id. at 922. 
 42. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 922 (quoting Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 368 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009), 
rev’d sub nom. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011)). 
 43. Id. at 931. 
 44. Id. at 929. 
 45. Id. at 919 (quoting Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)). 
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“the corporation is fairly regarded as at home” for the purposes of 
general jurisdiction.46 
Moreover, the Court identified its decision in Perkins v. Benguet 
Consolidated Mining Co. as the “textbook case of general jurisdiction 
appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not 
consented to suit in the forum.”47 In Perkins, the Court concluded 
that Ohio courts could exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation when the president of the company temporarily relocated 
the entity’s headquarters to Ohio during World War II, reasoning that 
the corporation’s “sole wartime business activity was conducted in 
Ohio . . . .”48 
B. Daimler AG v. Bauman 
Three years later, the Supreme Court again examined the contacts 
necessary to render a foreign corporation subject to general 
jurisdiction. In Daimler AG v. Bauman,49 residents of Argentina sued 
a German-based vehicle manufacturer in California federal court, 
alleging that an Argentinian subsidiary of the manufacturer 
collaborated to kidnap, detain, and kill Argentinian workers.50 
Jurisdiction was predicated on the California contacts of a Delaware 
subsidiary of the defendant that distributed the defendant’s cars in 
California.51 The defendant moved to dismiss the suit for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, and the trial court granted the motion.52 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that the defendant was subject to 
general jurisdiction because its subsidiary’s contacts with California 
were substantial and could be imputed to the defendant.53 
 
 46. Id. at 924. 
 47. Id. at 928 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air. Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
 48. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929. 
 49. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
 50. Id. at 122. 
 51. Id. at 123. 
 52. Id. at 124. 
 53. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 930–31 (9th Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. 
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). 
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The Supreme Court reversed, opining that approving jurisdiction 
“in every State in which a corporation ‘engages in a substantial, 
continuous, and systematic course of business’ . . . is unacceptably 
grasping.”54 The Court reiterated that the “essentially at home” 
standard governs the exercise of general jurisdiction and requires 
contacts so continuous and systematic as to render the corporation 
“comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State.”55 Even assuming 
the subsidiary’s contacts were imputable to the defendant, the Court 
held that the exercise of general jurisdiction ran afoul of the 
“essentially at home” standard and noted that “the same global reach 
would presumably be available in every other State in which [the 
subsidiary]’s sales are sizable.”56 Such “[e]xercises of personal 
jurisdiction so exorbitant . . . are barred by due process constraints on 
the assertion of adjudicatory authority,” and only an “exceptional 
case” such as Perkins would permit general jurisdiction over a 
foreign corporation.57 The Court stressed that due process required 
courts to assess not only the corporation’s footprint in the forum 
state, but also “an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their 
entirety, nationwide[,] and worldwide. A corporation that operates in 
many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.”58 
IV. Klein Likely No Longer Comports with Due Process 
Georgia courts have yet to meaningfully revisit the exercise of 
general jurisdiction after Goodyear and Daimler. No court has 
overturned or questioned Klein. Indeed, the Georgia Court of 
Appeals recently held in Ward v. Marriott International, Inc. that it 
was bound to apply Klein in determining that a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in Maryland was subject to 
general jurisdiction in Georgia based solely on its registration to do 
 
 54. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138. 
 55. Id. at 127, 132 & n.11. 
 56. Id. at 139. 
 57. Id. at 121–22, 139 n.19. 
 58. Id. at 139 n.20. 
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business in Georgia.59 The court tersely rejected the corporation’s 
argument that recent United States Supreme Court precedent 
foreclosed the exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign 
corporation in Georgia merely by virtue of its registration to do 
business, reasoning that Klein itself recognized its holding “comports 
with the requirements of federal procedural due process.”60 As 
discussed above in Part II, however, the Georgia Supreme Court in 
Klein expressly acknowledged that the constitutionality of exercising 
general jurisdiction over a registered foreign corporation “has not 
been challenged in this case, addressed by the parties, or ruled on by 
the lower courts.”61 The Klein court simply noted “it appears” its 
holding “does not run afoul” of procedural due process 
requirements.62 Klein’s reconsideration is overdue. The foreign 
corporation in Ward has filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the 
Georgia Supreme Court;63 Ward may present the court with an 
excellent opportunity to revisit Klein and to ensure Georgia law 
comports with the guarantees of federal due process. 
A. The Exercise of General Jurisdiction Over a Foreign 
Corporation by Virtue of Its Registration to Transact Business in 
Georgia Violates Due Process 
After Goodyear and Daimler, it is clear that a foreign 
corporation’s registration to do business cannot itself rise to the level 
of “continuous and systematic” affiliations to “essentially render it at 
home” within the forum state.64 As the United States Supreme Court 
recognized, the “paradigm all-purpose forums” are the corporation’s 
place of incorporation and its principal place of business.65 Outside 
 
 59. Ward v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., No. A19A0826, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 592, at *6–10 (Ga. Ct. App. 
Oct. 24, 2019). 
 60. Id. at *8–10. 
 61. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863, 865 n.3 (Ga. 1992). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Ward, 2019 Ga. App. LEXIS 592, petition for cert. filed, (Ga. Nov. 13, 2019) (No. S20C0485). 
 64. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
 65. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 118. 
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of those forums, a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in 
only an “exceptional case” in which the corporation’s operations are 
“so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at 
home in that State.”66 The commonplace business registration cannot, 
by itself, render a foreign corporation subject to any kind of claim in 
the state. Such a pervasive exercise of power would subject a 
corporation to general jurisdiction in every state it transacts business 
and would fly in the face of modern strictures of due process. Klein 
cannot survive on this basis. 
Courts that have taken up the issue resoundingly have held that 
registration to do business cannot render a foreign corporation 
subject to general jurisdiction. For example, the Eleventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a foreign corporation’s 
registration subjected the corporation to general jurisdiction in 
Florida, reasoning that “[a]fter Daimler, there is ‘little room’ to argue 
that compliance with a state’s ‘bureaucratic measures’ render a 
corporation at home in a state.”67 Several state supreme courts have 
concluded that subjecting a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction 
by virtue of registration would expose “properly registered foreign 
corporations to an ‘unacceptably grasping’ and ‘exorbitant’ exercise 
of jurisdiction” contrary to Goodyear and Daimler.68 Numerous 
federal courts have relied upon similar reasoning in spurning prior 
precedent.69 
 
 
 66. Id. at 139 n.19. 
 67. Waite v. AII Acquisition Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1318 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Brown v. 
Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 (2d Cir. 2016)). 
 68. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 141 (Del. 2016) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138); 
see also Facebook, Inc. v. K.G.S., Nos. 1170244, 1170294, 1170336, 2019 Ala. LEXIS 63, at *16–20 
(Ala. June 28, 2019); DeLeon v. BNSF Ry. Co., 426 P.3d 1, 10 (Mont. 2018); Segregated Account of 
Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 83 (Wis. 2017). 
 69. See, e.g., Humphries v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV-17-01606-PHX-JJT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
50632 (D. Ariz. Mar. 27, 2018); Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 227 F. Supp. 3d 249 (N.D.N.Y. 
2016); Dimitrov v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., No. 15 C 06332, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 170990 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 
22, 2015); Pitts v. Ford Motor Co., 127 F. Supp. 3d 676 (S.D. Miss. 2015); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:14-cv-01492-TWP-DKL, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139597 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 14, 
2015). 
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B. A Foreign Corporation Should Not Be Deemed to Have 
Consented to General Jurisdiction when It Registers to Transact 
Business in Georgia 
Although Klein can no longer comport with modern-day strictures 
of due process, it is possible that Klein’s ghost survives via the 
doctrine of consent. 
It is well-established that a foreign corporation can consent to a 
state’s jurisdiction by agreement or by defending a lawsuit without 
challenging jurisdiction. When a defendant consents to jurisdiction, 
his due process rights are deemed to be satisfied “because it is just 
and fair to require the defendant to defend a suit in a forum to which 
it previously agreed.”70 
Conceivably, a corporation’s registration could be read as consent 
to jurisdiction.71 Some courts have held that the due process strictures 
recognized in Goodyear and Daimler are bypassed by a corporation’s 
consent to jurisdiction via registration.72 Those courts rely chiefly on 
the United States Supreme Court’s 1917 opinion in Pennsylvania 
Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling 
Co., in which the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court’s 
holding that a foreign corporation consented to general jurisdiction 
by virtue of its appointment of an agent in Missouri in compliance 
with the state’s registration statute.73 The courts reason that because 
Goodyear and Daimler do not address consent, Pennsylvania Fire 
remains good law, and a state is free to conclude that registration acts 
as consent to jurisdiction.74 
To be sure, the Supreme Court has not expressly overruled 
Pennsylvania Fire. Nor does Goodyear or Daimler discuss consent.75 
 
 70. DeLeon, 426 P.3d at 5–6. 
 71. See id. at 5 (“Consent jurisdiction is an independent basis for jurisdiction.”). 
 72. Mitchell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 159 F. Supp. 3d 967, 977 (E.D. Mo. 2016). 
 73. Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96–97 (1917). 
 74. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Ford Motor Co., No. A-1-CA-26402, 2018 N.M. App. LEXIS 78 (N.M. 
Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2018); McDonald AG Inc. v. Syngenta AG (In re Sygenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig.), 
No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65312 (D. Kan. May 17, 2016). 
 75. See generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, 
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
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Although the continuing viability of Pennsylvania Fire raises 
difficult questions, a majority of courts that have addressed the issue 
have concluded that Pennsylvania Fire and the consent-by-
registration doctrine no longer comport with modern-day notions of 
due process. Courts have reasoned that “Pennsylvania Fire is now 
simply too much at odds with the approach to general jurisdiction 
adopted in Daimler”76 and “reflect[s] the reasoning of an era when 
states could not exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation 
absent the appointment of an agent for service of process.”77 Indeed, 
the Supreme Court has “caution[ed] against reliance on cases 
‘decided in the era dominated by’ the ‘territorial thinking’” before the 
“transformative decision on personal jurisdiction” in International 
Shoe.78 
Klein was not decided on the basis of consent.79 The court never 
mentioned consent (or Pennsylvania Fire), and its cursory analysis of 
the constitutionality of the definition for nonresident was predicated 
on sufficient minimum contacts.80 If consent were the basis for Klein, 
there would be no reason to assess whether the party had minimum 
contacts with Georgia. 
Moreover, under Georgia law, a person or entity consents or 
voluntarily waives a known right only where its “acts or omissions to 
act, relied on, should be so manifestly consistent with and indicative 
of an intention to voluntarily relinquish a then known particular right 
or benefit, that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is 
possible.”81 It seems a bridge too far to suggest that Georgia’s 
 
 76. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 638 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 77. Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 
70, 82 (Wis. 2017). 
 78. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1557–58 (2017) (quoting Daimler, 571 U.S. at 138 
n.18). 
 79. See generally Allstate Ins. Co. v. Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863 (Ga. 1992). Although a few authorities 
have stated that Klein was decided on the basis of consent, those authorities have not addressed the case 
in detail and are not persuasive. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 2018 N.M. App. LEXIS 78, at *32–33. 
 80. See generally Klein, 422 S.E.2d 863. 
 81. Ga. Power Co. v. O’Bryant, 313 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Jones v. Roberts 
Marble Co., 84 S.E.2d 469, 471 (Ga. Ct. App. 1954)); see also Hardy v. Lucio, 578 S.E.2d 224, 226 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming dismissal for insufficient process where movant had not manifested 
intent to waive service); Millard v. Millard, 419 S.E.2d 718, 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming 
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registration statute implies consent to general jurisdiction when the 
text of the statute does not mention consent or any explicit reference 
to general jurisdiction.82 
Goodyear and Daimler establish that the exercise of general 
jurisdiction simply because a corporation does business in the state 
violates due process, and the end run around that principle via 
consent is difficult to jibe with modern notions of due process.83 This 
is particularly true where courts conclude that foreign corporations 
waive the right to due process because registration acts as an implied 
consent to jurisdiction. As the Second Circuit opined: 
If mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in-
state agent—without an express consent to general jurisdiction—
nonetheless sufficed to confer general jurisdiction by implicit 
consent, every corporation would be subject to general 
jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and Daimler’s 
ruling would be robbed of meaning by a back-door thief.84 
Because Georgia’s registration statute does not expressly provide 
that a foreign corporation consents to general jurisdiction by virtue of 
its registration, due process seemingly requires Klein to be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Georgia’s exercise of general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations stands out as a sore thumb, wrenching due process 
rights from corporations that endeavor to provide business to the 
state. Georgia labels itself “one of the top pro-business environments 
in the nation.”85 Yet, as the Supreme Court of Delaware recognized, 
 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where movant had not waived defense). 
 82. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) (2017). Compare O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1501(a) with 42 PA. CONS. 
STAT. § 5301(a) (1981). 
 83. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 122; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 917 
(2011). 
 84. Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016). 
 85. Pro-Business, GEORGIA®, http://www.georgia.org.dev1.milesmediagroup.com/competitive-
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“If the cost of doing [business] is that those foreign corporations will 
be subject to general jurisdiction in [Georgia], they rightly may 
choose not to do so.”86 Klein must be revisited. It makes business 
sense, and it likely is required by federal law. 
 
 
advantages/pro-business/ [https://perma.cc/R735-WT46] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
 86. Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016). 
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